(registered 2026-10-13, last updated 2026-10-13) Scheme name: ordmail Status: provisional Applications/protocols that use this scheme name: On-chain mail applications on the ORDnet stack (ORDmail for iOS, with the wire format deployed on BSV: mail carried as an on-chain OP_RETURN envelope, optionally encrypted to the recipient's public key). An "ordmail" URI opens a compose view with the recipient pre-filled; sending is always an explicit user action. The scheme is deliberately separate from "mailto:" — web2 and web3 mail actions are never mixed, so applications can support both worlds without ambiguity. Specified in ODNCA-STD-011 (public draft); this registration will be updated as that specification is adopted. Contact: Alexander Taytelbaum, ODNCA — ORDnet Decentralized Names Coordination Authority, info&odnca.org Change controller: ODNCA (odnca.org) References: - ODNCA-STD-011 "WEB3-ACTIONS-1 - The URI Scheme Family" (public draft v0.5) — https://odnca.org/docs/ODNCA-STD-011-WEB3-ACTIONS-1.pdf - ODNCA-STD-003 "SNS-NAME-1 - Name Format Standard" — https://odnca.org/docs/ODNCA-STD-003-SNS-NAME-1.pdf Scheme syntax: ordmail: recipient :=
| "@" "." | "." | Colon-only form; producers MUST NOT emit "ordmail://". Names are UTF-8, no whitespace or control characters. No DNS interaction at any point. Scheme semantics: opens mail composition addressed to the recipient, resolved through the client's name-resolution ladder (bare address, mailbox at a name, SNS name, OpNS name — first match decides). Sending the message is a separate, explicit user action; the URI itself never sends anything. Encoding considerations: UTF-8 names; percent-encoding per RFC 3986. No IDNA/punycode processing. Interoperability considerations: no DNS resolution and no relation to "mailto:"; unaware applications treat it as an unknown scheme per RFC 3986. No authority component, no default port. Security considerations: composition only — handlers MUST NOT send without an explicit user action. Recipient resolution follows the same rules as the payment schemes: display the resolved destination, prefer verification against committed on-chain state where available. Visually confusable Unicode names carry the usual homograph risks.